It is generally argued that by organizing the delivery of health ser vices into prepaid group practice (pgp), providers have an incentive to minimize the cost of services they render. The drive for efficiency stems from a set budget from which operating costs are subtracted. Reinhardt (1973:205) has made the useful distinction that not only do prepaid providers try to produce services efficiently but they alsc seek the most economic mix of services which will satisfy the patients who have contracted for health care. "The great advantage inherent in prepayment plans such as Kaiser or HIP is that the financial in centives faced by these providers forces them to optimize over the en tire range of medical services normally produced by a health care system." . This study examines the aged population-a high-risk g ro u p - 
Description of Prepaid Group Plans
In order to accomplish the comparison between the tw organizational modes, it was necessary to determine whether prepai group enrollees had any specific advantage vis-a-vis open-mark< users which might make their use of health care services cheaper c more accessible or both. Therefore, a telephone interview was cor ducted with representatives of each pgp to determine the incentiv structure of the seven prepaid groups both with respect to monthl contributions required of aged enrollees and compensation provide to the physicians. Further, because we are interested in the full rang of Medicare services, data were obtained on the resource availabilit of all Medicare insured services: hospital care, extended care facility home health, and outpatient as well as physician services. Addition; information on selectivity patterns was obtained-whether and t what degree enrollment was open to the general public. Finally, basi data as to each plan's founding date and sponsorship were solicitec
The format of the following discussion will be to point out th extent of variation over the four dimensions: ( 1) organizational spor sorship; (2) resource availability; (3) incentive structure; (4) sele; tivity patterns. The results of the telephone survey are summarized in Table 2 .
Seven plans are analyzed: 
Organizational Sponsorship
Most (five) of the plans are community-based. That is, they are con trolled by a board of directors representative of the communities in volved. Also, their enrollees can originate from either group or in dividual subscribers in a circumscribed geographical area. Union Family of New York is an employer-employee union group. Group Health Cooperative is a consumer cooperative formed along the Rochdale principles. Important here is the principle that capital funds are raised by members. Organizational sponsorship presumably affects the goals and policies of pgps and some variation in performance would appear to stem from this source. One study by Schwartz (1968: 223-224 ) con trasts consumer cooperatives and physician-sponsored plans. The comparison showed that policies of consumer cooperatives are more favorable to enrollees in four areas: ( 1) individual enrollment prac tices; (2) eligibility policies; (3) complaint procedures; and (4) medical care benefits. On the other hand, physician-sponsored plans had an easier time staffing their plans' clinics with full-time prac titioners in various specialties.
The research here seeks to build on this characterization of pgps with different auspices. Unfortunately the seven groups studied do not fall into the dichotomy Schwartz studied. However, we can offer at least one prediction on the sponsorship dimension: GHC, the con sumer cooperative, may demonstrate higher costs than the remain- the Medicare enrollees of prepaid group practices. If the plan does not own or manage the facilities or agencies, it establishes contrac tual relationships to provide for these kinds of services. In terms of predicting provider initiated care-costs should be highest at Union Family, which uses two teaching hospitals to care for its patients, followed by HIP, which also does not own or manage its own hospital. Kaiser-LA and GHC would be lowest in costs, since their hospitals have high occupancy rates and unlike any other plan Kaiser-Los Angeles did own and manage one extended care facility.
Incentive S tructive-Physicians
To a major extent the cost savings of pgps has been attributed to the finanical incentives acting on pgp physicians. The argument goes that since physicians operate within a fixed budget, their services are costs to them and not to the patient. To remain competitive, plans cannot have too comfortable a margin for cost overruns and so the "tight" system is believed to deliver health care services most ef ficiently (Reinhardt, 1973 : 203 ff). Administrators of each plan were asked to what extent end-ofyear profits were shared as an incentive mechanism. It was thought that end-of-year profit sharing is a useful administrative tool to re mind practitioners of their stake in the financial solvency of the plan. The plans varied in their use of profit sharing: HIP and Kaiser both share and Community Health Association shares indirectly through Metro Hospital's profits. Union Family and GHC do not share. On discussing this strategy, it was found that alternatives such as a year ly salary increase as opposed to a lump-sum bonus payment probably have the same effect on physician behavior. One innovation discussed by GHC offers physicians the choice of increasing their salaries by accepting more enrollees in their groups or of hiring another full-time physician. Overall, the sharing of year-end profits is only one of a number of ways in which physicians were tied to the fate of the organization.
Physicians in these prepaid groups are usually salaried (Glaser, 1970: 25), i.e., paid "a fixed amount of money scaled according to the rank of the job and paid according to the amount of time the doc tor gives." All of the plans pay salaries to their full-time physicians. Salaries are often determined by the number of persons for which the particular group of physicians is responsible (capitation), but in the ing groups. Thus, just as Schwartz found consumer cooperatives to have higher costs, this pure type-without physician ownershipmay again prove to have higher costs than the six other pgps where ownership is not confined to the subscriber group.
Resource A vailability
Four plans (three Kaisers) and Group Health Cooperative describe themselves as hospital-based-indicating that these prepaid plans finance and operate their own hospitals. Community Health As sociation (CHA) approaches hospital ownership because its physi cians are drawn from the staff of one hospital and 85 percent of the hospital's patient load is drawn from the enrolled membership. However, because it contracts for hospital care, we cannot consider this hospital-based.' Health Insurance Plan (HIP) requires its enrollees to acquire supplemental hospital insurance to pay for these costs when needed. HIP physicians carry hospital appointments at various hospitals in the New York City area. Union Family contracts to provide hospital care at two teaching hospitals. Of those with hospital affiliations, the occupancy rate ranges from approximately 77 percent for Kaiser-Oakland and Portland and CHA, to 85 percent and over for Kaiser-Los Angeles, and Group Health Cooperative. Klarman has concluded that the evidence is equivocal whether short age of available beds in hospital-based pgps creates an artifically reduced utilization rate (Klarman, 1971). It will be interesting to compare hospital based pgps costs using occupancy rate as a probe.
With the exception of Kaiser at Los Angeles (where one ex tended care facility is adjacent to a hospital), no prepaid group owned or operated its own extended care facility. All other plans contract to provide such care. The Kaiser plans and GHC own and operate their own home health agency. HIP, Union Family, and CHA contract to provide patients with home health services. Finally, all the plans arranged for off-hour and emergency care to be provid ed by an Emergency Room or Outpatient Department of their affili ated hospital.
In general, the Medicare spectrum of resources are available to 'It was reported that hard bargaining occurs between CHA and hospital officials who contract to provide hospital care to CHA enrollees. Thus, CHA stands midway between the hospital based pgp on the West Coast and the non-hospital-based pgps of the East Coast.
the Medicare enrollees of prepaid group practices. If the plan does not own or manage the facilities or agencies, it establishes contrac tual relationships to provide for these kinds of services. In terms of predicting provider initiated care-costs should be highest at Union Family, which uses two teaching hospitals to care for its patients, followed by HIP. which also does not own or manage its own hospital. Kaiser-LA and GHC would be lowest in costs, since their hospitals have high occupancy rates and unlike any other plan Kaiser-Los Angeles did own and manage one extended care facility.
Incentive Structive-Physicians
To a major extent the cost savings of pgps has been attributed to the finanical incentives acting on pgp physicians. The argument goes that since physicians operate within a fixed budget, their services are costs to them and not to the patient. To remain competitive, plans cannot have too comfortable a margin for cost overruns and so the "tight" system is believed to deliver health care services most ef ficiently (Reinhardt, 1973 The general view of physician incentives assumes that physi cians are committed to the plans and that their remuneration derives largely from it. The distinction between part-and full-time commit ment by physicians serves as the critical basis for the cost prediction on the incentive structure: higher costs will be evident among plans with more part-time physicians.
Incentive Structure-Enrollees
Most of the respondents were unable to tell us about possible advan tages to their enrollees of using health services more than controls.
Administrators were asked who paid For the $50 deductible and 2 0 percent coinsurance which Part B required of Medicare recipients. Six of the plans were unable to state definitely whether the enrollee himself, or his employer, pension plan, or union fund paid these costs. Union Family indicated that the deductible and coinsurance were paid for by the employer.
Selectivity Patterns
We Table 3 shows that most of the plans do not have a Medicare (over 65) enrollment which matches their proportion in the counties In sum, the selectivity patterns show that while most of the plans have existed long enough to have retained a significant number of old members, their numbers are proportionately fewer than in the county areas. Leaving aside the issue of migration of some of the former enrollees, the policies of four of the seven groups studied en sure that no replenishment of their old dropouts takes place by prohibiting enrollment of non former group members. Two other plans permit open enrollment (HIP and CHA) with some limited screening by HIP. The last plan, a cooperative, allows members to enroll their aged dependents subject to screening. If one were to predict costs along the selectivity dimension, it would seem that lowest costs would be demonstrated by the four non-open enrollment plans, followed by the careful screening done at GHC and highest costs at HIP and CHA.
Data
The study draws on cost data derived from Social Security Ad ministration records of payments for persons identified as belonging to one of the seven selected prepaid groups. Each prepaid group practice has a matched control group which was formed by drawing a 5 percent sample of all Medicare enrollees who lived in the designated counties which serve the prepaid group practice enrollees. The sample was based on a specified combination of digits in the health insurance claim number.
Costs for the following Medicare-covered health care services are distinguished: (1) inpatient hospital, (2) outpatient hospital, (3) extended care facility, (4) physician services (and other Part B sup pliers), (5) home health care. The cost data reflect actual reimburse ments to Medicare recipients in the fee-for-service system for each type Of health service provided.
For physician services provided in prepaid groups, annual capitation figures are available. In addition out-of-plan physician services are included in the physician-services component so that we have a complete picture of actual costs incurred by the aged in prepaid groups. The data for the other components of the Medicare program are derived from actual payments to eligibles designated as prepaid group members.
Even though the data are fairly comprehensive with respect to the reimbursements under the Medicare program, the following qualifications should be noted. First, the sample was drawn by the Social Security Administration of all persons meeting the following requirements: ( 1) the beneficiary was enrolled for both Part A (hospital insurance) and Part B (medical insurance) for 1969 and 1970; (2) only terminations due to death remained in both sampled groups; (3) excluded were persons who were "state buy-ins"-individuals for whom the state paid the Part B premium; (4) ex cluded were members who, for reasons other than death, were partyear members of prepaid groups.
Since the data were organized to suit the needs of fiscal proces sors, this study lacked control over the content and format of the data source. Four independent variables figure into the analysis: enrollment mode, sex, age, and county areas. Data on health status and education were desired but could not be obtained. The depen dent (cost) variables are used under the assumption that the health level attained among enrollees in either mode is approximately equivalent. The monthly premium that individuals pay to their plan varies from plan to plan depending on the number of Medicare services provided, the costing methods used, the efficiency of the plan, and any non-Medicare covered service which the individual elects to take. For the same reasons, Social Security capitations to the plans vary.
A dm inistrative Arrangem ents M ade with Pgps by M edicare
It is evident, then, that Social Security reimbursed the plans only for physician and other Part B services which were actually used by the plan members. The data are unusual, however, because they reflect each individual's total Medicare costs, including costs in curred in the plan and costs incurred by using services outside the plan. In Tables 4 and 5 
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The Model
In analysis of variance, we begin by specifying a model-usually a linear model with each term showing the contribution of a unique factor or interaction of two or more factors. For each dependent variable Y, our model posits a mean level to which each factor adds or subtracts a significant sum measured in dollars. The null hypothesis is that the population means for the various levels of each factor are equal. Since the subclasses contain disproportional numbers of cases, as is usually true in comparative analyses (non-experimental research), then the row and column variables will be intercorrelated and there will be ambiguity as to which variable should be given credit for reducing variance. The Multivariance computer program performs an orthogonalization so that it tests the rows, ignoring the columns, and the columns, ignoring the rows. It also, of course, tests for interaction. Indeed, the major advantage of this design is that it permits the manipulation of independent variables so that their ef fects can be separated unambiguously, making it possible to assess the main effects, providing interactions are not too large.
To test the null hypothesis it is necessary to determine what each factor contributes to the differences apparent in the dependent variables. To accomplish this, we obtain a least squares estimate of the effects of each factor. These quantities (least squares estimates) represent what we gain in preference to use of the mean; they are the explained sum of squares.
Analysis o f Costs
The least squares estimates for the effect of prepaid group costs com pared with controls in 1969 show that costs are reduced among prepaid group members controlling for age, sex, and region in three components of the Medicare range of services: hospital, extended care facilities, and outpatient care. (Refer to Table 6 , top row). On the other hand, being in a prepaid group practice increases costs in both home health categories and for physician services. The net ef fect of being in a prepaid group practice in 1969 is to decrease costs 
ii ii z ; 
Hospital Costs
Data presented in Table 6 show that, for the most part, hospital costs are reduced in pgps which own and manage their own hospitals. In 1969, however, CHA managed to reduce its hospital costs far more than all other plans GHC excepted. Two factors may have con tributed to the excellent performance of CHA. First, " hard bargaining" occurred between the administrators of the Plan and Metro Hospital-the contracted facility which provided all inpatient care. Unlike HIP, for example, which requires its enrollees to purchase hospital insurance elsewhere, CHA included this in its negotiated package of offered services. Second, there are twice as many non-whites in CHA as in its control group. Perhaps the hospital contract combined with racial make-up of CHA creates the reduced utilization in hospital service.
In 1970 (refer to Table 7 ), HIP demonstrated small but signifi cant savings in hospital costs resulting probably from the Incentive Reimbursement Experiment (Jones et al., 1974) , which placed a nurse in six of the 30 clinics "to carry out general maintenance ac tivities with the group's elderly who were considered to be at high risk of hospitalization" and arranged for early discharge planning with hospital personnel for group members. CHA again showed sav ings but far less dramatic than those in 1969.
It is interesting to note that in 1969 Kaiser-Oakland showed least impressive savings in hospital costs compared with the other hospital-based pgps. Since Kaiser-Oakland had the lowest occu pancy rate of all the hospital-based groups, it seems that its perfor mance reflects a looser, less constrained hospital-bed resource situa tion. In 1970, Kaiser-Los Angeles reflected least cost savings in hospital care among the Kaiser groups.
Again, for hospital-based pgps, the 1970 occupancy rate was lowest in Kaiser-Oakland, but that year Kaiser-Los Angeles showed least savings (Tables 6 and 7) . Clearly factors other than limited bed resources are contributing.
Extended Care Facilities and H om e Health Care
All the prepaid groups with the exception of HIP saved in extended care facility costs compared with their controls (refer to Table 6 ). Only Kaiser-Oakland, however, showed a large and statistically significant savings. The relatively weak performance of this pgp in reducing hospital costs may be due in part to the lack of transfer of the aged patient to an extended care facility. This argument suggests that Kaiser-Oakland, instead of complementing hospital care with ECF care, kept patients in the relatively ample hospital system. Cost Summer 1976 / Health and Society / M M F Q savings in ECF care by Community Health Association is apparent ly big, but our confidence in this estimate is low. Finally, the higher ECF costs of HIP compared with controls parallels their increased hospital costs.
In 1970, Kaiser-Oakland again shows ECF cost savings, but they are less significant, which is in line with its greater savings in the hospital component. This year, Kaiser-Los Angeles, the only pgp with its own ECF, exceeded costs of controls. If CHA showed cost savings in 1969, it demonstrates cost increases in 1970, but they are not statistically significant. Finally, HIP in 1970 has become more like its control and has saved in ECF care compared to 1969 (refer to Table 7) .
Home health Part A cost differences between each prepaid group and its control are negligible in all but the three Kaiser groups where negative savings are displayed. Even in Kaiser-Los Angeles, however, the differences are not significant. Part B home health costs are also considerably higher in the Kaiser-Oakland group com pared with its control. Less significant cost increases are also seen in the Kaiser-Los Angeles group. Cost patterns are almost identical for 1970 and for 1969. Kaiser-Portland joins the other Kaiser Plans by increasing Part B costs significantly relative to its control (Table 7) .
Overall, viewing ECF and home health cost estimates, it ap pears that Kaiser-Oakland is unique in saving on ECF care and spending on home health care. Kaiser-Portland and Kaiser-Los Angeles spend about the same as their controls on ECF care but ex ceed their controls in home health care. It seems that home health care in the Kaiser system is used to a greater extent than ECF care, which is contracted out because these closed systems have incor porated home health care into their range of services and timely transfer of patients to home health service within the system is easy. Indeed, it might be suggested that in these tight systems, home health services are used as substitutes and not merely complements to hospital-based health care. To a lesser extent, the data suggest that the Kaiser organizations prefer to substitute home health ser vices (which are operated by the plans themselves) not only for hospital care, but also for extended care facility which is generally contracted out. The obvious exception to this is Kaiser-Los Angeles ECF costs in 1970, where greater costs are evident in addition to more home health costs. This same plan, however, as noted above, saved more hospital costs in 1970 than in the previous year. Substitu tion of home health for ECF care is especially evident in KaiserOakland.
Despite the apparent substitution of less expensive (home health) for more expensive (hospital) health care services by the Kaiser plans, these groups do not save as much vis-a-vis their con trols as do Community Health Association and Group Health Cooperative in 1969. The greatest departure of a prepaid group from its control in 1970 was Group Health Cooperative, followed by Kaiser-Portland. In general, the greatest dollar savings are evidenced by groups which depart from their controls significantly in hospital care, less so in ECF care, and have virtually identical costs in home health care compared with controls.
Hospital Outpatient Department
Finally, outpatient savings are generally evident for each pgp com pared with its control. Union Family, however, shows an insignifi cant increase compared with its control (Table 6 ). Data from 1970 reveal an identical pattern with Union Family's increase in out patient costs approaching statistical significance (Table 7) . These findings are probably a consequence of the fact that outpatient ser vice is only used at off hours in prepaid groups. In contrast, out patient services are a continuously available option in the fee-forservice system. In effect, it is argued that persons in the open-market modes employ outpatient clinic services as substitutes for visits to physicians in their offices. This view is supported, in part, by findings of Hill and Veney (1970), who point out that outpatient services are not substitutes for hospital services.
Discussion o f Net Savings o f Each Group
At this juncture, having discussed the individual plan's results on each dependent variable, we will discuss the overall or net effect of each plan contrasted with its control group. This analysis, it should be remembered, does not look at the simple observed means; rather, least squares estimates are used in an effort to subtract out the unique effect of differences in age distribution, sex distribution, and regional variation. What is left, we hope, is the effect of each organization reflecting its differences in charges to the Social Security Administration's Medicare Program.
Summer 1976 / Health and Society / M M F Q portance of the third party syndrome will increase." In large pgps, these authors suggest, physicians face the Prisoners' Dilemma: if all follow the behavior pattern they will be worse off than if none fol lows it; but they all have incentives to cheat-to follow the behavior pattern while hoping that others restrain themselves. In sum, the varied savings to the Medicare program among the groups we studied probably result from limited hospital resources. Further in vestigation is needed to ascertain whether some social psychological factors operate with greater force for economy on physicians in the smaller plans.
Conclusions
Evidence has been presented which indicates that major cost savings to the Medicare program occur in prepaid groups which reduce hospital costs. While physician costs are generally higher among enrollees in pgps (as a result of out-of-plan use) overall, the membership in these closed practices incur lower costs than Medicare enrollees in the counties which these pgps service. The problem of selectivity of prepaid groups for healthier or more cooperative aged persons limits our ability to assert that our findings are exclusively the effect of the mode of health service delivery.
In terms of the Medicare mix of services, prepaid group enrol lees generally incur higher costs for physician services and home health care, while those in the open market incur higher costs for hospital care and outpatient services. Some evidence is presented to support the concept that it is the smaller hospital-affiliated pgp which effects greatest cost savings. 
